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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
p. H. INVESTMENT, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
CATHY OLIVER, : 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
Case No. 890357 
Priority 13 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code $78-2-2(3)(a) and (5). This is a review of a decision 
by the Utah Court of Appeals by writ of certiorari. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether a tenant is entitled to raise contract defenses 
in an unlawful detainer action seeking unpaid rent to compensate 
her for the landlord's violation of Salt Lake City housing 
ordinances• 
2. Whether an implied warranty of habitability exists in 
Utah residential rental agreements. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code. S78-36-3 to 10; Salt Lake City Ordinances S5-11-1 
(recodified during this appeal at S18.48.010). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an unlawful detainer action by a landlord against a 
tenant based upon non-payment of rent. The landlord's complaint 
sought a writ of restitution and a judgment for rent owed and 
treble damages based upon Utah Code §78-36*3 to 10. 
The case was tried to the Honorable Robert C. Gibson, judge 
of the Fifth Circuit Court for Salt Lake County* He granted 
judgment to landlord against tenant of $80.36 for rent, treble 
damages of $630.00, and costs of court of $19.35, together with an 
Order of Restitution of the premises. Tenant received an offset 
of $200.00 against this judgment for her deposit (R. 54, T. 59). 
The court dismissed tenant's rent rebate counterclaim with 
prejudice. 
At the trial, William Cupit, a Housing Officer with Salt Lake 
City Building and Housing Services, testified that there were 
forty-two violations of Salt Lake City ordinances which adopted 
the Uniform Housing Code and the Uniform Code for the Abatement of 
Dangerous Buildings. These violations included numerous serious 
electrical violations, a hazardous stairway without handrails, 
holes in the walls in every room, dilapidated and rotted floors and 
carpets, a collapsed bathroom ceiling, a collapsed bedroom ceiling, 
leaking faucets, shower and toilets, broken and missing windows, 
lack of bathroom door, and inadequate protection from weather (T. 
30-33, Ex. D-l). Cupit had found the building to be substandard 
and dangerous, declared it to be a public nuisance and ordered it 
repaired or demolished (T. 33,R.46). The tenant argued she owed no 
rent and additionally sought a rebate of rent paid based on the 
numerous conditions that violated Salt Lake City Ordinances S5-11-
1 (R. 5-6), namely the Uniform Housing Code and the Uniform Code 
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for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. 
The trial court gave three reasons for enforcing the rent due 
under the lease, awarding treble damages under the unlawful 
detainer statute and for refusing any rent rebate or any damages 
due to the landlord's violations of the law: 
1. The court should not interfere in the contractual 
arrangement entered into by tenant and landlord. 
2. A tenant is not entitled to any rent offset or damages 
for landlord's breach of an implied warranty of 
habitability because the Utah Supreme Court has never 
delineated such a defense or cause of action. 
3. Tenant waived any defense or cause of action under a 
theory of warranty of habitability by agreeing to rent 
the premises in their deteriorated condition (R. 47, 
T. 59). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided court, stating that 
although the existing law "badly needs reform," P.H. Investment v. 
Oliver. 778 P.2d 11, 14 (Utah App. 1989) and that the -rules 
employed in cases such as this, so lacking in rationale and 
justification, cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely,- 778 
P.2d at 14, the Court would take no action and deferred to the 
legislature, citing the lack of complete information and a fear of 
developing case law in -fits and starts.- 778 P.2d at 13, n.8. 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Garff agreed with the 
analysis of the majority that the law was antiquated but concluded 
that there was no reason to continue to defer to the legislature 
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which has failed to take any action for many years and opined that 
the court should judicially adopt an implied warranty of 
habitability to avoid continued violations of principles of 
fundamental fairness and to "avert future human suffering and 
tragedy-. 778 P.2d at 16. 
The matter now comes before this court for a determination of 
tenant's remedies for landlord's breach of the housing codes, 
whether a warranty of habitability is implied in Utah rental 
agreements, and whether the breach thereof constitutes a defense 
to an unlawful detainer action and justifies a rent rebate to 
tenant• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By operation of law, housing codes are made a part of all 
rental agreements in Utah. Here the landlord has breached his 
rental contract by flagrant violations of these codes. This court 
should delineate the contract remedies available to tenant. 
The vast majority of states has adopted the implied warranty 
of habitability and has allowed it as a defense in unlawful 
detainer actions. This Court should join those other states by 
articulating this doctrine in Utah, reverse the trial court 
decision and award tenant a rent rebate to compensate her for 
landlord's breach of this warranty. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN RESIDENTIAL 
RENTAL AGREEMENTS HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN MOST STATES 
AND SHOULD BE JUDICIALLY ADOPTED IN UTAH. 
The trial court based its decision on an application of the 
doctrine of caveat emptor (or more exactly, caveat lessee) in 
rental agreements. The appeals court opinion explicitly determined 
that caveat emptor applies to landlord/tenant relationships. This 
concept has been nearly universally rejected as no longer 
reflecting the realities underlying the landlord/tenant 
relationship in modern society. Instead, the majority of states 
has turned to the concept of implied warranty of habitability. 
An implied warranty of habitability has three elements. The 
first is that the warranty exists by implication in all residential 
landlord/tenant agreements to the effect that the premises are fit 
for their intended use—human occupancy. Habitability is 
frequently measured by compliance with housing and health codes. 
Second, the landlord's warranty and the tenant's covenant to pay 
rent are mutually dependent. And third, the breach of the warranty 
by the landlord justifies the tenant in suspending the payment of 
rent. In turn, the breach of warranty is a defense to an action 
by a landlord for non-payment of rent. 
The existence of a warranty of habitability derives 
historically from combining principles of property, contract, and 
tort law, as developed below. It prevails in a majority of 
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jurisdictions in this country today. 
A. The Historical Basis for Applying Caveat 
wmp-hnT- No Longer Exists in Modern Society. 
Courts adopting the implied warranty of habitability 
inevitably begin with a discussion of the anachronistic caveat 
emptor doctrine in today's society. The U. S. Court of Appeals for 
the D. C. Circuit wrote in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.. 
428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970): 
Since, in traditional analysis, a lease was the 
conveyance of an interest in land, courts have 
usually utilized the special rules governing 
real property transactions to resolve 
controversies involving leases. However, as 
the Supreme Court has noted in another context, 
the body of private property law . . ., more 
than almost any other branch of law, has been 
shaped by distinctions whose validity is 
largely historical. Courts have a duty to 
reappraise old doctrines in the light of the 
facts and values of contemporary life 
particularly old common law doctrines which the 
courts themselves created and developed 
(footnote omitted). 
The history of the landlord's maintenance duties returns us 
to the Norman Conquest, when the land was divided into great 
estates ruled by lords.1 With the advent of the landlord's 
Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment in the fifteenth century came the 
creation of a new social institution - the landlord/tenant 
relationship. The chief duty of the landlord was a negative one: 
Mto keep his overseer away from the premises while the tenant had 
the right to occupy and farm the land."2 This negative covenant of 
non-interference changed to an affirmative duty in the nineteenth 
1
 See Bovle, The LanriinrH s^ warranty of Habitabilitv: A Plea 
for Statutory Reform. 1984 Fla. Bar J. 509. 
Id. 
6 
century with the change of life occasioned by the industrial 
revolution. In Edwards v. Etherincrton. 171 Eng. Rep. 1016 (1825), 
the court introduced the concept of an affirmative duty to see to 
structural repairs of the leased premises. A series of cases 
expanded this new concept.3 The result was the continued 
development of an inference of a warranty of habitability in the 
residential landlord/tenant relationship until the Housing Act of 
1925, which provided statutorily for an implied warranty of 
habitability in the lease of every residence in London where the 
rent did not exceed forty pounds. 
American courts, unfortunately, followed the common law in 
England only up to the 18th century. Although England progressed, 
courts in the United States continued to insulate the landlord from 
liability. It was not until the 1970 's that courts were willing 
to look beyond the frozen doctrine of caveat emptor associated with 
agrarian England. 
Various factors have influenced courts in shedding the old 
baggage. First, courts began to recognize the changed shelter 
needs of the modern urban dweller. One of the first courts to 
recognize the need for change noted that N[w]hen American city 
dwellers • • • seek * shelter' today, they seek a well known package 
of goods and services - a package which includes • • • adequate 
heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, 
3
 See Collins v. Barrow, 174 Eng. Rep. 38 (1831) (tenant held 
justified in abandoning leased dwellings that suffered from lack 
of proper drainage); Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (1843) 
("in point of law every house must be taken to be let upon the 
implied condition that there was nothing about it so noxious as to 
render it uninhabitable"). 
7 
secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper 
maintenance." Javins. 428 F.2d at 1074 (cited by this Court in 
Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1985)). 
Second, the lack of adequate housing has caused unequal 
bargaining positions, leaving tenants with little leverage to 
enforce a request for improved housing conditions. "[E]ven when 
defects are apparent the low income tenant frequently has no 
realistic alternative but to accept such housing with the 
expectation that the landlord will make the necessary repairs." 
Green v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco. 
Ill Cal. Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168, 1174 (1974).4 
Third, the agrarian doctrine assumed equal skill, incentives 
and resources between the landlord and the tenant in discerning or 
remedying any problems with the land and simple buildings. In 
modern society, it is the landlord who has the superior knowledge 
and financial capability required to maintain the leased premises. 
Many potential or actual defects are not readily apparent or are 
difficult or expensive to remedy, particularly in large buildings. 
The Florida Supreme Court noted that "we now live in an age where 
the complexities of housing construction place the landlord in a 
much better position to guard against dangerous conditions." 
Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So.2d 1328, 1330 (Fla. 1981). 
Fourth, courts have analogized the landlord/tenant 
relationship to the seller/consumer context and utilized the 
Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranty of merchantability 
4
 See Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitabilitv: A Dream 
Deferred. 48 UMKC L. Rev. 237, 240 (1980). 
Q 
theory to hold landlords responsible for providing a product 
suitable for the intended use. The Missouri appellate court 
observed that the tenant's lack of knowledge of the true condition 
of the leased premises rendered him just as vulnerable as if he had 
purchased an automobile. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 73 (Mo. 
App. 1973). 
Fifth, many courts have looked to the widespread enactment of 
housing and building codes as a major change, imposing new 
responsibilities on landlords. See Petling v. Edelbrock, 671 
S.W.2d 265, 269 (Mo. 1984). 
Modern courts, recognizing these factors, have abandoned the 
outmoded doctrine of law based on agrarian reality, and have 
adopted implied warranties of habitability. 
B. The Majority of States Today Recognizes an 
Implied Warranty of Habitability. Either 
Statutorily or Judicially Imposed. 
Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted the 
implied warranty of habitability, either statutorily or judicially 
or both.5 The judiciary initiated acceptance of the doctrine in 
twenty of these jurisdictions.6 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 
590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), is generally credited with the first 
judicial exposition of an implied warranty of habitability in 
5
 See Appendix A for complete list of states which recognize 
the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability. 
6
 See case citations in Appendix A for California, District of 
Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. 
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residential leases. This decision was followed by Lemle v. 
Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969), where the court 
unabashedly stated: 
The application of an implied warranty of 
habitability in leases gives recognition to the 
changes in leasing transactions today. It 
affirms the fact that a lease is, in essence, 
a sale as well as a transfer of an estate in 
land and is, more importantly, a contractual 
relationship. From that contractual 
relationship an implied warranty of 
habitability and fitness for the purposes 
intended is a just and necessary implication. 
It is a doctrine which has its counterparts in 
the law of sales and torts and one which when 
candidly countenanced is impelled by the nature 
of the transaction and contemporary housing 
realities. Legal fictions and artificial 
exceptions to wooden rules of property law 
aside, we hold that in the lease of a dwelling 
house, such as in this case, there is an 
implied warranty of habitability and fitness 
for the use intended. 
The Javins decision, probably the most widely cited of all 
these cases, followed in 1970, and was quickly succeeded by 
decisions in New Jersey, New Hampshire, Iowa, Illinois, Ohio, 
Massachusetts, Washington, California, Kansas, New York, Indiana, 
Texas, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania during the 1970's. Later, 
courts in Vermont and Missouri joined the trend. While differing 
3omewhat in scope of application and remedies, all these decisions 
followed a similar pattern. They rejected traditional property law 
analysis in favor of a contract based analysis, incorporated 
relevant changes in other areas of law that had preceded the 
iecision, and melded the analysis with legislative pronouncements 
:hat concerned housing conditions. During this period, only a few 
states clung to the traditional doctrine of caveat leasee: 
U.abama, Arkansas, Colorado, Mississippi, and South Carolina. 
i n 
Looking at the more recent decisions from Vermont and Missouri 
is instructive- In Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984), 
the Vermont Supreme Court explained how the recognition of an 
implied warranty of habitability grew out of existing Vermont law. 
prior case law had recognized that contracts contain interdependent 
covenants and thus contract remedies are available for breaches of 
a lease. The legislature had authorized the establishment of local 
housing authorities to assure the existence of adequate housing. 
State and local entities had adopted minimum housing standards. 
Against this backdrop, the court recognized an implied warranty of 
habitability and explained the tenant's remedies for its breach. 
Ultimately, the court held that M[i]n light of these changes in 
the relationship between tenants and landlords, it would be wrong 
for the law to continue to impose the doctrine of caveat lessee on 
residential leases.- Id. at 207. In 1984 the Missouri Supreme 
Court, in Detlina v. Edelbrock, looked to prior Missouri cases 
holding that a lease is both a contract and a conveyance, to cases 
holding that a vendor/builder of a new home warrants the home's 
fitness as a residence and to widespread adoption of housing codes 
throughout the state as the basis for its adoption of a warranty 
of habitability in residential leases. 
This Court has in other legal settings recognized that a 
landlord has a duty to provide a safe dwelling and that violations 
of municipal housing codes are violations of the contract between 
landlord and tenant, gee Hall v. Warren (Hall I), 632 P.2d 848 
(Utah 1981), and Hall v. Warren (Hall II), 692 P.2d 737 (Utah 
1984). These holdings amount to a recognition that a landlord 
11 
warrants a habitable dwelling to a tenant, although without using 
the rubric of "warranty of habitability." This Court should 
clearly establish that such a warranty of habitability inheres in 
all residential leases in Utah and should recognize the breach of 
such warranty as a defense in an action for unlawful detainer and 
unpaid rent. 
POINT II 
THE LANDLORD'S MULTIPLE VIOLATIONS OF CITY 
ORDINANCES CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF THE 
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL AGREEMENT. THE TENANT SHOULD 
BE ALLOWED TO RAISE ALL AVAILABLE CONTRACT 
DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIMS IN AN UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER ACTION SEEKING UNPAID RENT. 
The landlord herein violated Salt Lake City building and 
housing codes forty-two times and thus breached his contract with 
the tenant; however the trial court decided this case by simply 
looking at the written agreement between the parties and 
defendant's admitted failure to pay rent. The court recognized no 
legal significance in the testimony regarding the condition of the 
premises and the landlord's violation of city ordinances. The 
trial court erroneously concluded that it could not -interfere" in 
the -arrangement" entered into by the landlord and tenant (R. 47, 
T. 59). The tenant does not seek -interference- with but rather 
enforcement of the contractual agreement between herself and her 
landlord. By refusing to consider the tenant's contractual claims 
as a basis for non-payment, the trial court erred. This Court 
should enforce a tenant's right to raise the landlord's breach of 
as a defense or counterclaim in an unlawful detainer 
action. 
n 
This Court has recognized that "the contemporary approach 
toward leased habitations . . . emphasizes the contractual nature 
of the relationship between the landlord and tenant . • . H and 
has held that "the provisions of the city's housing code relating 
to minimum housing standards were by implication read into and 
became a part of the rental agreement" between landlord and tenant. 
Hall I at 850. Three years later this Court reaffirmed its holding 
that provisions of a building code adopted as an ordinance of a 
city "are considered as much a part of the lease as if expressly 
stated in the contract." Hall II at 738.7 Therefore, by renting 
a dwelling with numerous violations of the Salt Lake City housing 
code, the landlord in this case breached the rental agreement with 
this tenant. 
In Hall I and Hall II this court held that such a violation 
can give rise to an action for tort damages. This Court should now 
establish that the landlord's violation of the contract gives rise 
to traditional contract remedies as well. Such a conclusion is 
consistent with Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d at 726, 727. There 
this court noted that M[l]andlord liability is no longer limited 
by the artificial categories developed by the common law . . . . 
Rather the lessee's rights, liabilities and expectations are more 
appropriately viewed as governed by contract and general principles 
of tort law" (emphasis added)• 
Other jurisdictions that allow tenants to raise uninhabitable 
conditions as a defense to eviction actions hav^ often relied upon 
7
 In the Hall cases tenants were entitled to maintain a tort 
action against the landlord for injuries caused by a faulty floor 
furnace in violation of Vernal City's building ordinances. 
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such contractual theories. In Javins, the court held that the 
tenant's duty to pay rent and the landlord's duty to provide and 
maintain a safe and healthy dwelling are mutually dependent. 
Under contract principles . . . the tenant's 
obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the 
landlord's performance of his obligations, 
including his warranty to maintain the premises 
in habitable condition. In order to determine 
whether any rent is owed to the landlord, the 
tenants must be given an opportunity to prove 
the housing code violations alleged as breach 
of the landlord's warranty. 428 F.2d at 1082. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court similarly held that 
Mthe tenant's covenant to pay rent is dependent on the landlord's 
implied warranty of habitability." Boston Housing Authority v. 
Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973). Once the contractual 
nature of the relationship was recognized, that court necessarily 
concluded that contractual remedies were available and identified 
recision of the lease, rent withholding and rent abatement as 
possible remedies. 
Other jurisdictions have explored the nature and scope of 
a tenant's contract remedies and have articulated various such 
remedies. The tenant whose landlord fails to maintain the premises 
in a habitable condition should be able to rescind the contract 
without incurring further liability for rent (Teller v. McCoy, 253 
S.E.2d 114 (W.Va. 1978), Hilder v. St.Peter, Pugh v. Holmes. 405 
A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979), Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway. Lemle 
y. Breeden, Pines v. Perssion. Marini v. Ireland. 56 N.J. 130, 265 
A.2d 526 (1970)); deduct the costs necessary to make the dwelling 
habitable (Pugh v. Holmes, Hilder v. si-. pptorr Marini v. Ireland^ ; 
bring an action for damages (retroactive rent abatement) to be 
1 A 
measured by the difference in value between the reasonable rental 
value of the uninhabitable dwelling and the fair market rental rate 
if the premises were as warranted (Green v. Superior Court, Boston 
Housing Authority v. Hemingwayr Puah v, Holmes, Hilder v. St. 
Peter, King v> Moorehead); sue for specific performance (South 
Austin Realty v, Sombriaht. 47 111. App.3d 89, 361 N.E.2d 795 
(1977)); withhold rent and raise the landlord's breach in defense 
to an action for summary dispossession I Green v. Superior Court, 
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, Detling v. Edelbrock, Pugh 
v. Holmes, Hilder v. St. Peter, King v. Moorehead, Teller v. 
McCoy); or sue for additional damages (Hilder v. St. Peter, Detling 
v. Edelbrock, Old Town Development Company v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 
744 (Ind. App. 1976), vacated and dismissed as moot, 369 N.E.2d 404 
(1977). Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974)). 
Having recognized violations of a building code as breaches 
of the rental contract, this Court should now confirm that tenants 
have contractual remedies for this breach and delineate those 
remedies. Such an explanation would resemble the recent decision 
in Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989), 
wherein this court, by Justice Zimmerman, answered the related 
question whether Utah common law imposes a duty upon landlords to 
mitigate their damages by reletting after a tenant has wrongfully 
breached a lease. In a footnote, the court stated that 
modern landlord-tenant relationships • • . have 
taken on substantive characteristics so similar 
to commercial transactions that certain of the 
legal principles developed in the law of 
contracts in the context of commercial 
transactions are now appropriately applied to 
leases . . . . 776 P.2d at 902, n.3. 
i<* 
After reviewing the law from other jurisdictions, the court found 
that "the principal justifications to support the traditional rule 
are to a large extent anachronistic." The court then reviewed the 
analysis from related contract damage cases, discussed the policy 
implications of a new rule, including the effects on the state and 
national economies, and reviewed the thoughts of legal 
commentators. The court then set forth the rule to be followed in 
Utah and spelled out how the lessor's newly articulated mitigation 
obligation is to be met. 776 P.2d at 905-06. The same type of 
analysis should be utilized in the present case to articulate the 
contract remedies for a tenant facing a breach by the landlord. 
From a pleading perspective, raising any and all relevant 
defenses or counterclaims in unlawful detainer cases has been 
authorized by White v. District Court, 120 Utah 173, 232 P.2d 785 
(1951), and Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102 (Utah 
1977). 
These contract remedies are necessary because remedies now 
available are simply inadequate to assure safe and decent housing 
for tenants of landlords who refuse or fail to maintain their 
premises. The presently recognized remedies are limited to 
constructive eviction,8 possible code enforcement by municipal 
housing inspectors, and a tort action if the tenant is seriously 
injured as a result of the housing code violations. 
The constructive eviction defense is an impractical remedy in 
that it requires the tenant to vacate the premises. Brugger v. 
8
 See Backman, Landlord-Tenant Law; A Perspective on Reform in 
Utah, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 727, 740. 
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Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647 (Utah 1982). This is a burdensome requirement, 
particularly for low income renters, those most often affected by 
uninhabitable conditions. These tenants have difficulty in moving 
because of a lack of affordable decent housing and their lack of 
money for moving expenses and deposits. As a result, those low 
income tenants who do move often find themselves in another equally 
dilapidated dwelling* Moveover, constructive eviction is 
unavailable in cases of "partial breach" where the housing is 
clearly inadequate, but where a partial rental payment is 
justified. 
Housing code enforcement has been ineffective in remedying the 
habitability problem, as the Javins court noted. Failure of this 
method stems from the courts' unwillingness to recognize housing 
violations as crimes and to impose appropriate fines.9 When courts 
do impose fines, they are often minimal and are simply treated as 
a cost of doing business. Even worse, if inspection results in a 
condemnation, the tenant is again subjected to the problem of 
finding another adequate and affordable dwelling. A presidential 
commission reported that inadequate enforcement has led to 
thousands of landlords in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods openly violating building codes 
with impunity, thereby providing a constant 
demonstration of flagrant discrimination by 
legal authorities . . . . [I]n most cities, few 
building code violations are corrected, even 
when tenants complain directly to municipal 
building departments • . • • [T]he open 
violation of codes [acts] as a constant source 
of distress to low-income tenants and creates 
serious hazards to health and safety in 
9
 Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and 
Remedies, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1254, 1279, 1280 (1966); See also 
Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An 
Integration, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 50-51 (1976). 
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disadvantaged neighborhoods. 
The speculative possibility of a tort action for serious 
injuries to the tenant is clearly no answer to tenants' need for 
safe dwellings. 
Allowing the tenant to enforce contractual rights gives the 
best promise of meaningful enforcement of municipal building codes. 
It avoids the tenant's need to rely solely upon overworked 
inspectors to enforce the law. It promotes enforcement before 
serious injury has occurred. It allows the trial courts to fashion 
appropriate, focused remedies to insure that unsafe conditions are 
corrected and that the tenant pays a fair rent to allow necessary 
repairs to be made. Finally, recognizing traditional contract 
remedies for this breach of contract is in keeping with basic legal 
principles. 
Likewise, public policy should not allow the landlord to claim 
a waiver on the part of the tenant in order to avoid liability 
mder the warranty of habitability doctrine. Most courts hold that 
the warranty of habitability is applicable from the outset even 
rhen the tenant enters into the lease agreement with knowledge of 
idverse conditions in the dwelling.11 This result is only logical. 
The Supreme Court of California in Knight v. Hallsthammar. 
.71 Cal. Rptr. 707, 623 P.2d 268, 273 (1981), addressed this issue 
lirectly: 
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
disorders 472 (Bantam ed., 1968). 
11
 See, e.g., King v. Moorehead. 495 S.W.2d at 75; Glvco v. 
chultz, 289 N.E.2d 919, 925 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972); Foisv v. 
vman, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1973); Boston Housing Authority v. 
emingway, 293 N.E.2d at 843. 
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[T]he fact that a tenant was or was not aware of 
specific defects is not determinative of the duty 
of a landlord to maintain premises which are 
habitable. The same reasons which imply the 
existence of the warranty of habitability - the 
inequality of bargaining power, the shortage of 
housing, and the impracticability of imposing upon 
tenants a duty of inspection - also compel the 
conclusion that a tenant's lack of knowledge of 
defects is not a prerequisite to the landlord's 
breach of the warranty. 
The opinion there also rejected, as inconsistent with Green. any 
duty on the tenant to inspect for defects which may render the 
premises uninhabitable and reversed a jury instruction which barred 
the warranty defense for failure to inspect. Id. at 273 n.5. 
Thus, the trial court's determination here that the tenant waived 
her warranty of habitability defense (T. 59) misstates the law and 
public policy and should be overturned. 
The Knight court also spoke to another issue in the present 
case, the change of ownership during the tenancy. The court there 
stated that Ha tenant may defend an unlawful detainer action 
against a current owner . . . despite the fact that the 
uninhabitable conditions first existed under a former owner". 623 
P.2d at 275. 
POINT III 
RECOGNITION OF A CONTRACTUAL REMEDY FOR 
UNINHABITABLE PREMISES IS CONSISTENT WITH 
THE DEVELOPING COMMON LAN, AND RECENT 
LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS AND COMPORTS WITH THE 
PROPER ROLE OF THE COURT. 
The majority in the Court of Appeals decision recognized that 
the court has inherent power to change "the judge-made rules at 
issue in this case." However, that majority -abstained" from doing 
so due to a mistaken belief that "the Legislature is better able 
1 Q 
to undertake such a revision" of what "judges of yesteryear have 
written." 778 P.2d at 13 n.5. That majority entertained a 
mistaken belief that this case requires a "single precipitous leap" 
to create a "new rule of . . . [broad] scope". 778 P.2d at 13. 
In fact, the most important common law rights at issue here 
have already been recognized by this Court. The narrow questions 
presented in this case involve delineating remedies rather than 
creating new rights. This case requires only that this Court "fill 
in gaps between related laws," 778 P.2d at 13, a proper and 
necessary role for the courts. This Court has recognized no 
doctrine that would require or even suggest restraint or inaction 
here. 
A. It is this Court's Province to Develop the 
Common Law. 
The Court of Appeals properly recognized that this case 
presents a question of common law. The court's scope in changing 
the common law is broad and requires no deference to a legislature: 
M[T]his Court may alter . . . an interpretation of the common law 
. . . to conform with evolving standards and changing times." 
Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah 
1987). 
The tenant's common law right to live in a safe, habitable 
dwelling and her contractual right to an apartment that conforms 
with city ordinances have already been established by this Court. 
See Hall I, Hall II and Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567 (Utah 
1978). The only remaining question is whether the tenant should 
have a contractual remedy to enforce that right. The tenant does 
not seek a "precipitous leap" of law, but rather the logical 
on 
application of traditional contract remedies to the present breach 
of an established contractual and common law duty. 
B. Legislative Acts in Utah Suggest that 
this Court Should Recognize a Warranty of 
Habitability and Grant a Contractual 
Remedy for its Breach, 
"It has always been the duty of the common-law court to 
perceive the impact of major legislative innovation and to 
interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of 
common law principles . . . ." Moraane v. State Marine Lines 398 
U.S. 375, 392 (1970). See also Peters, Common Law Judging in a 
Statutory Worldt An Address, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 995, 998 (1982) 
and Stone, The Common Law in the United States 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 
13 (1936). 
In Utah, a variety of state and local legislative actions 
indicate a public policy favoring safe, habitable housing. Since 
1969 the Utah legislature has consistently stated a policy to 
provide safe and sanitary housing for the citizens of this state 
and to upgrade housing that does not meet minimum standards of 
habitability. In that year the legislature authorized the creation 
of local housing authorities and stated in Utah Code S55-18-1: 
It is declared to be the policy of the state of Utah 
to promote the general welfare of its citizens that 
it is necessary to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary 
housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, 
safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of medium 
and low income, in urban and rural areas. These 
conditions cause an increase and spread of disease 
and crime, and constitute a menace to the health, 
safety, morals, and welfare of the state. The 
provision of safe and sanitary dwelling 
accommodations at rents or prices which persons of 
medium and low income can afford will materially 
assist in developing more desirable neighborhoods 
and alleviating the effects of poverty in this 
S U u L C . . . . 
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In 1975/ the Utah Housing Finance Agency was created and again 
the legislature set forth the policy of this state: 
I., is declared that the policy of the state of 
Utah is to assure the health, safety and 
welfare of its citizens, that an adequate 
supply of decent, safe and sanitary housing is 
essential to the well-being of the citizens of 
the state • . • • 
It is found and declared that there continues 
to exist throughout the state a seriously 
inadequate supply of safe and sanitary dwelling 
accommodations within the financial means of 
persons and families of low and moderate income 
• • • • 
Jtah Code §63-44a-2 
In 1977, the legislature adopted the Utah Residential 
lehabilitation Act, Utah Code §11-25-1, to upgrade residential 
>roperties in deteriorating areas. In 1987 the legislature created 
.he Housing Development Restricted Account and authorized its board 
o expend monies appropriated for rehabilitation of low-income 
ousing units and -other activities that will assist in improving 
he availability or quality of housing in the state for low-income 
ersons." Utah Code §55-18a-105. 
Finally, in 1989, the legislature directed the statewide 
doption of the Uniform Building Code, the National Electrical 
Dde, the Uniform Plumbing Code, and the Uniform Mechanical Code, 
iah Code §58-56-4, and established a new agency, the Uniform 
lilding Code Commission, to oversee the implementation of these 
>des. 
In addition to these state pronouncements, all counties have 
tablished boards of health which have general responsibility for 
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sanitation abatement. Many cities, including Salt Lake City and 
Ogden, have adopted local ordinances such as the Uniform Housing 
Code, the Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings and 
others. Salt Lake City's ordinances, which were violated by the 
landlord in this case, are also legislative acts which are entitled 
to enforcement.12 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in -deferring- to the state 
legislature here, failed to recognize these significant legislative 
actions which both state and city governments have taken. These 
actions clearly express a policy of safe, habitable housing which 
would be advanced by recognizing the tenant's right to enforce that 
policy in an unlawful detainer action. 
Courts in other states have focused on such legislative 
pronouncements to determine how the common law is to be developed. 
For example, the court in Teller v. McCoy. 253 S.E.2d at 122, 
stated that "[t]he Legislature has clearly embarked on a course to 
change the common-law no-repair rule and its correlative doctrine 
of caveat emptor by recognizing that urban tenants seek not just 
space, but a habitable place to live (emphasis in original).H 
The court then quoted the Pines case, stating that "[t]o follow 
the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases 
would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative 
policy concerning housing standards." Similar statements can be 
found in Pugh, 405 A.2d at 905, and in Boston Housing Authority v. 
12
 -This Court has frequently stated that the enactment of 
zoning laws and ordinances is the exercise of a legislative 
function.- Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 253 (Utah 1982) 
(citations omitted). 
23 
Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d at 841, among other cases. 
C. Mo Doctrine of "Judicial Abstention" or 
"Restraint" is Relevant Here. 
Neither the "haphazard" unavailability of appellate cases nor 
the court's "limited means of gathering information" justify 
"deference" to the legislature in this case. Nor does any doctrine 
of judicial restraint justify denying the tenant the remedy she 
seeks. 
The Court of Appeals abstained from altering antiquated common 
law in part because "the judiciary is . . . limited by the 
happenstances that bring cases into appellate litigation ..." 778 
P. 2d at 13. That court wrongly assumed that because of 
"happenstance," "[i]t has taken all of those almost thirty years 
[of doctrinal development in this area] for a single case to arrive 
at a Utah appellate court and squarely present the issue." 778 P.2d 
at 13 n. 8. However, it was litigation strategy and the appellate 
process for unlawful detainer actions rather than "happenstance," 
rtiich generally prevented such cases from being brought before an 
tppellate court of record prior to 1987, when the Utah Court of 
appeals was created and given jurisdiction over appeals from the 
ircuit courts.13 Now a body of consistent law in the landlord 
enant area is likely to develop. 
Procedural advantages motivate most landlords to file 
rilawful detainer actions in the circuit courts. Until 1987 
ppeals from these actions were heard by the district courts and 
leir decisions were not published. This procedural anomaly best 
cplains why the courts' consideration of the relationship between 
indlord and tenant has arisen most often in the context of tort 
rtions. See e.g. English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah App. 
189). 
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Although perhaps never squarely presented, this Court has 
flirted with the concept of an implied warranty of habitability at 
least as far back as 1978 when, in Barlow v. Keener, No. 15609 
(Utah Dec. 1, 1978), Justice Hall stated in dissent that once a 
plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action had made a claim for 
unpaid rent, the defendant could properly assert the defense of 
warranty of habitability. Slip op. at 3 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
In that unpublished case, the majority explicitly chose not to deal 
with the question of the availability of the warranty of 
habitability defense. 
As Judge Garff pointed out in his present dissent, this Court 
declined to rule on the question again in 1981 in Hall I, "because 
of the abbreviated briefing on the issue". 778 P.2d at 16 (Garfff 
J., dissenting). When that case came before this Court after 
remand, the Court again declined to consider the question, stating, 
"in view of our resolution of the above issue, we need not reach 
the issue of whether there is a duty imposed on a landlord by an 
implied warranty of habitability . . . ." Hall II at 739. Again, 
in a slightly different context, this Court noted that -we do not 
decide the issue of whether this jurisdiction would recognize a 
cause of action for breach of implied or express warranties of safe 
accommodation and habitability . . . . - Mitchell v. Pearson 
Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1985). 
Finally, in Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d at 726, this Court 
held that "Utah has not held that there is an implied warranty of 
habitability in residential leases, and we decline to address the 
issue now because it has not been raised but . . . [l]andlord 
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liability is no longer limited by the artificial categories 
developed by the common law." This issue is now squarely raised. 
The Utah Court of Appeals' concern with the courts' "limited 
means of gathering the broad information necessary," 778 P.2d at 
13, is illusory. The information necessary to evaluate this 
development in the law has been collected and reported in various 
studies.14 The Heskin study, which surveyed California courts 
following that state's recognition of this warranty, determined 
that: 
1. Green is being employed more often and violations of 
the warranty occur less often than assumed. 
2. The use of the warranty does not affect the housing 
market• 
3. The warranty is leading to the repair of property and 
could assist code enforcement if knowledge of it 
spreads• 
4. Tenants who remain in possession do not have their 
rents substantially raised. 
5. Most tenants or their lawyers are not inclined to 
abuse the law. 
Heskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate at 67. 
Moreover, since the warranty of habitability was first 
recognized almost thirty years ago, more and more states have 
adopted it. Today forty-two states recognize this doctrine. That 
Eact alone indicates that it has been a workable change in the law. 
No principle of judicial restraint justifies denying the 
ippellant the remedy she seeks. This Court has relied upon certain 
14
 See, e.g., Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on 
ehalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income 
edistribution Policy, 80 Yale L.J. 1093 (1971); Heskin, The 
arrantv of Habitability Debate: A California Case Study, 66 
alif. L. Rev. 37 (1978). 
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well-settled principles of restraint, including stare decisis and 
settled interpretations of statutes, in modifying and enunciating 
rights and remedies.15 In considering whether to recognize a new 
cause of action this Court has also practiced judicial restraint, 
where the parameters of new rights and obligations are difficult 
to predict. None of these principles justifies a ruling in favor 
of the landlord here. 
The principle of stare decisis applies once a court has duly 
considered and decided an issue. Thereafter, the court should 
generally follow its own precedent, even if new arguments are made 
against it.16 This Court has stated M[The precedent] is, in any 
event, a reasoned determination persuasively based on prior Utah 
authorities and, in its own right, now embedded in the law of this 
state for many years. Such precedents should not be overruled 
except for the most compelling reasons . . . . H Wilson v. Manning, 
657 P.2d at 254. 
Here the principle of stare decisis does not apply. This is 
a case of first impression. The issue has never had the benefit 
of a reasoned determination by this Court. The existence of an 
unexamined practice is due no deference by this Court. 
In deferring to the state legislature, it is possible that the 
Court of Appeals believed statutory interpretation was at issue 
15
 The Court of Appeals in this case cited several cases which 
discuss th^se principles. 
16
 See J. P. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judae-Made Rule, 58 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1, 9 (1983). Justice Stevens there summarized the 
considerations to address• in overruling a case: Mthe possible 
significance of intervening events, the possible impact on settled 
expectations, and the risk of undermining public confidence in the 
stability of our basic rules of law." 
27 
here. 778 P.2d at 13 n.5, citing Hackford v. Utah Pnwer & Light 
Co., 740 P.2d at 1283, and Mickelsen v. Craigco Inc., 767 P.2d 561 
(Utah 1989). Where a court has interpreted a statute, that 
interpretation is entitled to even greater deference than the 
court's common law precedent.17 But here there has been no 
judicial interpretation of a statute, so no judicial interpretation 
has been woven into the law or commands any deference. Nor are 
there statutory formalities that only the legislature can revoke. 
See Mickelsen v. Craigco Inc., 767 P.2d at 565.18 If anything, 
this Court's recognition of a remedy to enforce rights recognized 
by this Court and promoted by various state laws and city 
ordinances will provide harmony and consistency in the law. 
The United States Supreme Court discussed the most important 
reason for the rule of stare decisis: -the desirability that the 
law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable 
them to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise 
. . . ." Moragne 398 U.S. at 403.19 Justice Zimmerman expressed 
the same concern for proceeding "with care" in developing the 
common law: 
[T]he lead opinion completely fails to 
establish predictable guidelines for 
17
 Nevertheless, even statutory interpretations can be altered 
depending upon their "plausibility", the degree to which the 
interpretation has been "woven into the fabric of the law" and the 
strength of the argument for change. Hackford. 740 P.2d at 1283, 
1285. 
18
 This was a valid concern in Mickelsen because the court 
alone was unable to "eliminate . . . statutory formalities and 
bring consistency and clarity to this area by judicial fiat." 
767 P.2d at 565 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
19
 Moragne overruled The Harrisburg case decided in 1886, and 
recognized an action for wrongful death under general maritime law. 
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determining what that duty is and when an 
employer can be found to owe such a duty to an 
employee . . . . [T]he cost of uncertainty for 
employers is simply too great to justify 
creation of the cause of action proposed by the 
lead opinion." 
Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1051-52 (Utah 
1989) (Zimmerman concurring in the result).20 In Moragne, as in this 
case -the confidence of people in their ability to predict the 
legal consequences of their actions . . . is threatened least by 
a new remedial rule to effectuate well-established primary rules 
of behavior.M 398 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added). 
Here, too, tenant seeks simply a remedial rule. Here, too, 
there are well-established rules of behavior. Landlords are 
already obligated by city ordinance to maintain safe, habitable 
dwellings. Their failure to do so can result in tort liability or 
in city demolition of the property. Recognition of the -remedial 
rule19 that uninhabitable living conditions can be raised as a 
contract defense by a tenant exposed to those conditions would 
impose no new, unpredictable obligation on the landlord. In this 
case there can be no mystery as to what duty is owed and no new 
uncertainty will be imposed. 
In conclusion, there is no justification for deferring to the 
legislature to enforce appellant's rights here. There has already 
been legislative action to promote safe habitations, and this Court 
has already decided closely related issues regarding landlords' 
In Berube, this Court altered the common law regarding 
employment at will to recognize an employee's right to enforce 
covenants implied in the employment contract. However, three 
justices refused to change the common law to establish a more 
general and less predictable -covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.-
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duties. Other courts have chosen this route as well. See Jack 
Soring. Inc. v. Little, 50 111.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Pugh 
v. Holmes. 405 A.2d at 903-09. According to Judge Roger Traynor, 
courts are not "bound to maintain [the law they have made until] 
the legislature undertakes to unmake it.H Traynor, Reasoning in a 
Circle of Law. 56 Va. L. Rev. 739, 745 (1970). Rather, as Judge 
Keeton has argued, when courts can alter rules in the service of 
legal principles, Hcourts have both the power to overrule and the 
responsibility for exercising that power." R. Keeton, Venturing 
to do Justice: Reforming Private Law 22, (1969). 
CONCLUSION 
Tenant sought to raise as a defense to an unlawful detainer 
iction her landlord's failure to comply with applicable building 
tnd housing codes and the uninhabitable condition of her dwelling. 
fncontroverted evidence showed the existence of numerous code 
iolations. These codes are a part of the lease between the 
arties by operation of law. This Court should declare that a 
arranty of habitability exists in all residential leases, should 
ecognize that the breach of such warranty or the breach of the 
sntal contract through violations of housing codes may be raised 
s a defense to an action for unlawful detainer, and should 
rticulate the additional remedies available to tenants in this 
tuation. 
Petitioner Oliver asks this Court to reverse the trial court's 
dgment and remand the case for calculation of damages on her 
fenses and counterclaim. 
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APPENDIX A 
STATES WHICH RECOGNIZE THE DOCTRINE OF 
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 
Judicially Adopt-OH. 
California: 
District of 
Columbia: 
Georgia: 
Hawaii: 
Illinois! 
Indiana: 
Iowa: 
Kansas: 
Massachusetts\ 
Michigan: 
Missouri: 
New Hampshire: 
^ ^ ^ 704, 517 
(West 1974, )# Q&1' c*v- fr*1fi, SS1941, 1942 
(1970) )# SSS^' £&&§&* 400 U.S. 925 
Givens v. Gray, 126 Ga. App. 309 IQQ c . ,, 
607 (1972) ' 190 s«B.2d 
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P 2d 470 
(1969); Haw. Rev. st»»..r S521-42; S521 - 61 
through 78 (Supp. 1974) 
Jack Spring. Inc. v. Little. 50 111.2d 351, 280 
N.E.2d 208 (1972) (limited to existence of 
municipal building code) Extended to all 
leases regardless of codes by Glasoe v. 
Trinkle. 479 N.E.2d 915 (111. 1985) 
Old Town Development Co. v. Langford. 349 
N.E.2d 744 (Ind.App. 1976), vacated and 
dismissed as moot, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977) 
Mease v. Fox. 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972); Iowa Code 
Ann. S562 A (West 1979) 
Steele v. Latimer. 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 
(1974) codified in Kan. Stat. Ann. S58-2553(a) 
(1975) 
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway. 363 
Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); and Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann.. ch. 239, S8A (West Stpp. 1974) 
Rome v. Walker. 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 
850 (1972) Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.. S554.139 
(West Supp. 1974) 
Detlina v. Edelbrock. 671 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1984) 
Kline v. Burns. Ill N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 
(1971); N.H. Rev.Stat. Ann. S540A 1-8 (1985) 
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New Jersey: 
Ohio: 
Pennsylvania: 
Texas: 
Vermont: 
Washington: 
West Virginia: 
Wisconsin: 
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 
(1970) 
Glvco v. Schultz. 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 
919 (Sylvania Mun.Ct. 1972); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. SS5321.04, 5321.07 (Page Supp. 1974) 
Puah v. Holmes. 405 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979) 
Kamarath v. Bennett. 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 
1978); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 92.052 (Vernon 
1984) 
Hilder v. St. Peter. 478 A.2d 202 (1984); 
(Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 §4457-59 (1985) 
Foisv v. Wvman. 83 Wash.2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 
(1973) (en banc) 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. S59.18 (Supp. 1974)1 
Teller v. McCov. 162 W.V. at 367, 253 S.E.2d 
114 (W.Va. 1978); W.Va. Code S37-6-30 (1988) 
Pines v. Perssion. 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 
409 (1961); but see. Posnanski v. Hood. 46 
Wis.2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970). 
Legislatively Adopted! 
Alaska: 
Arizona: 
Connecticut: 
Delaware: 
'lorida: 
daho: 
entucky: 
aine: 
iryland: 
Alaska Stat. SS34.03.100, 34.03.160, 
34.03.180 (1974) 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. SS33-1324, 1361 (1973) 
Conn. Gen. Stat. SS47-24b (West 1969); 
LeClair v. Woodward. 6 Conn.Cir. 727, 316 A.2d 
791 (1970) 
Del. Code Ann, tit. 25, S5303 (1981) 
Fla. Stat. Ann. SS83.51, 83.56 (West 1981); 
Mansur v. Eubanks. 401 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1981) 
construing the statute 
Idaho Code S6-320 (1984) 
Kv. Rev. Stat. Ann. SS383.500 to 383.515 (1974) 
(URLTA adopted) 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann, tit. 14, S6021 (1989) 
Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. S8-211 (Supp. 1986) 
A - 2 
Minnesota: 
Montana: 
Nebraska: 
Nevada: 
New Mexico: 
New York: 
North Carolinai 
North Dakota: 
Oklahoma: 
Oregon: 
Rhode Island: 
South Carolina: 
Tennessee: 
Virginia: 
Minn. Stat. Ann. S504.18 (West 1971), 
applied in Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 
N.W.2d 339 (1973) 
Mont. Code Ann. SS42-420 and 42-426 (1977) 
Neb. Rev, Stat. §§76-1419, 76-1425, et seq. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. SH8A.290 (1970) (but note that 
the act does not protect tenants whose landlord 
owns fewer than seven units) 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§70-7-1 (1975) and N.M. 
Stat. Ann. §§47-8-1 to -51 (1978) (URLTA 
adopted) 
N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§235-b (McKinney 1975) 
N.C. Gen. Stat. §42-42(a)(l) (1984) 
N.D. Cent. Code §47-16-13.1 (1977) 
Okla. Stat. Ann, tit. 41f §118 (West 1978) 
Or. Rev. Stat. §§91.770, 91.800-.815 (1974) 
(URLTA adopted); L & M Investment Co. v. 
Morrison. 286 Or. 397# 594 P.2d 1238 (1979), 
upholding and interpreting habitability 
sections of statute. 
R.I. Gen. Laws §§34-18-1 to -56 (1987) (URLTA 
adopted) 
S.C. Code Ann. §27-40-440 (Law Co-op.Cum.Supp. 
1987) 
Tenn. Code Ann. §§66-28-101 through 516 (1975) 
Va. Code Ann. §§55-248.2 to -248.40 (1988) 
(URLTA adopted) 
NOTE: URLTA, the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act, includes 
a warranty of habitability at Sections 2.14 and 4.105. 
No Warranty of Habitability 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
South Dakota 
Utah 
Wyoming 
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ADDENDUM 
Chapter 11 
HOUSING 
Sections: 
5-11-1. Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement oi 
Dangerous Buildings adopted. 
5-11-2. Governing body. 
5-11-3. Housing inspection fees. 
5-11-4. Housing Advisory and Appeals Board. 
5-11-5. Conduct of hearing appeals. 
5-11-6. Performance of abatement work. 
5-11-7. Recovery of cost of repair or demolition. 
5-11-8. Conditional permit for temporary securing. 
5-11-9. Public nuisance and administrative review. 
Sec. 5-11-1. Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement 
of Dangerous Buildings adopted. The Uniform Housing Code, 1982 edition, 
hereinafter sometimes referred to as "UHC", and the Uniform Code for the 
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, 1982 edition, hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as "UCADB", are hereby adopted by Salt Lake City as the 
ordinances, rules, and regulations of said City, subject to the amendments and 
exceptions thereto as hereinafter set out: three copies of said codes shall be 
filed for use and examination by the public in the office of the City Recorder of 
Salt Lake City. The purpose of these codes is to provide minimum 
requirements for the protection of life, limb, health, property, safety, and 
welfare of the general public and the owners and occupants of buildings within 
Salt Lake City and providing for correction of violations thereof. Hereafter all 
references in the revised ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 1965, to the 
Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous 
Buildings, 1976 editions adopted by Section 5-11-1 are amended and deemed 
to read the Uniform Housing Code, 1982 edition and Uniform Code for the 
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, 1982 edition. 
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ADDENDUM 1 - 1 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613 
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8891 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
P. H. INVESTMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CATHY OLIVER, 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 873-2236CV 
1 
I 
> 
*3 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial on ti 
5th day of March, 1987, the Honorable Robert C. Gibson presiding 
Plaintiff appeared by its agent Stan Secor and by counsel James 
H. Deans. Defendant appeared in person and by counsel Bruce 
Plenk of Utah Legal Services, Inc. The court having heard 
arguments and testimony, considered the evidence and good cause 
appearing, now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 1^  
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties and subj^ J 
matter of this action. 
2. Plaintiff is the owner of real property located at 22 
Iowa Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
N 
3 
ADDENDUM 2-1 
3. Plaintiff is the successor in interest to the rental 
agreement entered into between Rainier Huck and defendant* 
4. Defendant rented the premises on or about November 1, 
1986, and at that time the premises were in a dangerous and 
deteriorated condition which was never repaired by Plaintiff's 
initial landlord, Rainier Huck, or by Plaintiff, Defendant 
testified that the condition of the premises at the time of tria 
was as bad as the condition on November 1, 1986. 
5. Defendant has failed to pay the monthly rental for 
February, 1987. 
6. Defendant was served a 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or 
Vacate on or about February 6, 1987. 
7. Defendant is currently occupying the premises in 
unlawful detainer. 
8. There is no document in evidence that would allow for 
an award of attorneyfs fees to either party. 
9. Defendant called as a witness Mr. William Cupit, an 
enforcement officer with nine years1 experience employed by the 
Salt Lake City Building and Housing Services who testified that 
he inspected the premises on February 19, 1987, and at that time 
there were 42 violations of the Uniform Housing Code and the 
Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, both of 
which have been incorporated into the ordinances of Salt Lake 
City. Mr. Cupit testified that on the date of his inspection anc 
for a lengthy period of time before that day the building was 
substandard and dangerous, a public nuisance and subject to 
abatement by repair, rehabilitation or demolition. 
10- Mr. Cupit testified that he would close the building tj 
occupancy if it were vacant and that he advised the Defendant to 
attempt to relocate* He further testified that on March 3, 1987, 
he sent formal notice to Plaintiff to repair or demolish the 
building* 
11. Defendant testified that when she rented the building 
she was not aware of the extent and nature of the code violation} 
and that she could not afford other housing nor could she now 
afford to move. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court will not interfere in the contractual ar-
rangement entered into by defendant and plaintifffs assignor. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant in 
the sum of $80.36 for rent from February 1, 1987, through Febru-
ary 9, 1987, and for treble damages in the sum of $630.00 from 
February 10, 1987, through March 6, 1987, and for costs of court 
of $19.35, together with an Order of Restitution for the premis-
es. Defendant is to receive an offset of $200.00 against this 
judgment representing her deposit. 
3. Defendant's counterclaim should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
4. Defendant is not entitled to any offset against rent 
which she owes based on her defense of a breach of an implied 
warranty of habitability by Plaintiff nor is she entitled to 
recover any damages for Plaintiff's beach of an implied warranty 
of habitability because the Supreme Court of this state has nev^ f 
delineated such a defense or cause of action. 
5. Defendant has waived any defense or cause of action 
under a theory of warranty of habitability by her agreeing to 
rent the premises in their deteriorated condition. 
DATED this / 7 day of /t2/^W*Q 1987. 
ROBERT C. GIBSON 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed 
first class to James H. Deans, Attorney for Plaintiff, 175 
South Main* Suite 500, Salt Lake,, City, Utah 84111. 
day of vuJ f^LLry^jH^ , 1987. DATED this< 
KfY\iLLu.^ii'JL 
bp/oliver.fin 
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613 
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8891 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
P. H. INVESTMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CATHY OLIVER, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial the 
5th day of March, 1987, the Honorable Robert C. Gibson presiding 
and plaintiff appearing by its agent Stan Secor and by counsel j 
James H. Deans and defendant appearing in person and by counsel' 
Bruce Plenk and the court having entered its Findings of Fact anj 
i 
Conclusions of Law and good cause appearing, now, j 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: 
i 
1. Possession of the premises at 224 Iowa Street, Salt 
i 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, be delivered to the plaintiff 
and that the defendant and the defendants property (and all 
persons claiming a right to occupancy through defendant) be 
removed from the premises. All rights to occupancy through 
defendant arising from the Rental Agreement are terminated, and 
* 
* 
* CORRECTED JUDGMENT 
» 
* 
* 
* Civil No. 873-2236CV 
* 
* 
II 
the Sheriff or Constable is dir-^^ * 
i * ^ e l , 8Cted t0 e t t C U" m ' ' — 
2. Plaintiff
 is entitle, to Jud^ent agai„st Defendant in 
« * sun, of *80.36 for rent fron, February 1
 1987 thr h 
arv 9 1987 ,„H * ' t h r o u 9 h Febru-
ary 9, 1987, and for treble damaoes in tk. . 
'
 ln the sun
 °* S630.00
 froni 
February 10. 1987. through „aroh ,. „ „ , ^  ~ 
« « , . „ . to9ether with an Order of sestltution for the p r U T 
... Pendant is to re=eiye an offset of «00.00 against this 
iud^ent represents her deposit. Pi a i n t i f f is thus 
judgment of $529.71. 
3. Defendant's Counterclaim^ dismissed with prejudice 
DATED this _ / 6 _ day of 2 ^ ^ T ^ 
KUtiEKT C. GIBSON* 
CIRCUIT; COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE op MAIETMB*',. 
ing CORSOTS S S D S S O T * ^ maiSd ? ? r ^ ° ^ e C t ?°P y o f t h e f o « g c 
DATED thi S c 2£^day of' Q&4& bMj 1987. 
bp/oliver.jud 
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